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Abstract In the past decades, profession(al)s have
increasingly been called to account. Several authors have
reported that this increased public professional account-
ability, in the form of showing that professional conduct
meets predefined standards or rules, has had severe nega-
tive consequences for professionals, their clients and
society, and call for ‘intelligent’ forms of accountability;
forms of accountability that may inform a wider public
about professional conduct but do not harm it. In this paper,
we propose a form of ‘intelligent’ public professional
accountability. Taking Freidson’s (Professionalism. The
third logic, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001) notion of
institutional ethics as a point of departure, we develop a
form of accountability that seeks to account for the con-
ditions required for professional conduct. The paper first
discusses the current ‘dilemma of professional account-
ability,’ describes ‘ideal-type professional conduct’ and
goes into the conditions it requires. Next, it shows what
accounting for these conditions entails and that this form of
accountability fits the criteria for intelligent accountability,
as set by O’Neill (in: Morris and Vines (eds.) Capital
failure: rebuilding trust in financial services, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2014).
Keywords Professional accountability  Intelligent
accountability  Conditions for professional conduct
Introduction: The Dilemma of Public Professional
Accountability
In the last 30-odd years, professionals (doctors, veterinar-
ians, lawyers, nurses, accountants, psychologists, etc.) have
increasingly been called to account (cf. Power 1994, 1997;
O’Neill 2002, 2013, 2014; Banks 2004; Lunt 2008; Evetts
2011). Several reasons, among which professional scandals
and malpractices, the increase of managerialism, and the
introduction of market competition (cf. Freidson 2001;
O’Neill 2002, 2014; Banks 2004; Hood and Heald 2006;
Lunt 2008; Levay and Waks 2009), have forced profes-
sionals to work ‘‘according to procedures […and…] to
predefined standards/targets/outcomes’’ (Banks 2004,
p. 152). Traditionally, professions were granted consider-
able autonomy in delivering their services to society, but as
Lunt (2008) describes, they now suffer from a loss of
public trust ‘‘[…] in the ability of professions to regulate
the behavior of their own members’’ (Lunt 2008, p. 86).
Calling professionals to account is thought to decrease
professional misconduct and to restore public trust.
In the last decades, then, professionals increasingly have
had to give an account of their conduct to a wider public,
e.g., to their direct clients, their representatives and/or to
society in general. However, many authors are critical of
the form and the extent of this professional accountability.
Accountability (either in the form of following procedures
and rules or in the form of working to pre-determined
targets or standards; we will use the term ‘calculative
accountability’ to refer to these two forms; see also Kamuf
2007) has been argued to harbor several problems (cf.
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Messner 2009; O’Neill 2002, 2013, 2014; Power
1994, 1997; Roberts 2001, 2009; Shearer 2002). The most
important problem seems to be that calculative account-
ability forces professionals to give an account that abstracts
from the specific situations professionals have to respond
to. Such accounts do not do justice to and cannot fully
capture professional decisions and actions—which require
a context-specific interpretation and translation of complex
and tacit professional knowledge and experience (see also
Tsoukas 1997; Schwartz and Sharpe 2010; Schwartz 2011;
O’Neill 2002, 2014). Decontextualized indicators or rules
are not only a strength of calculative accountability, as they
can make things visible to distant others (Roberts 2009)
and allow for easy and cheap measurement (O’Neill 2014),
but also a weakness, for they do not account for the in situ
specifics that professionals face.
Besides the problem of ‘decontextualization,’ it has also
been argued that calculative accountability provides per-
verse incentives and induces instrumental behavior (e.g.,
Power 1997; O’Neill 2002, 2014; Roberts 2001, 2009;
Messner 2009; Schwartz 2011), and that it may lead to
alienation (e.g., Banks 2004; O’Neill 2002), decreased
professional responsibility (O’Neill 2002; Kamuf 2007)
and lack of empathy (Roberts 2009; Schwartz 2011).
Instrumental behavior can come about if one becomes pre-
occupied with meeting targets or following rules (as indi-
vidual or institutional evaluation depends on it; e.g.,
Roberts 2001). Such instrumentalism may lead to poor
professional performance if the good thing to do in a
specific situation no longer depends on context-specific
discretionary professional judgment and dedication, but
only on what the rules prescribe or on the targets that need
to be reached (cf. O’Neill 2002, 2014; Schwartz 2011).
Moreover, if calculative accountability does indeed
diminish the professional ‘‘autonomy and room for dis-
cretion’’ (Banks 2004, p. 8), it may come as no surprise that
professionals may find it difficult to appreciate their work
as professional work, feel alienated from it, and have
trouble in upholding their dedication to professionals val-
ues (cf. O’Neill 2002; Banks 2004; Schwartz and Sharpe
2010; Schwartz 2011).
However, although calculative accountability has
received much criticism, accountability is, of course, not
irrelevant to professions. If professionals are supposed to
realize some societal value they should be ‘‘accountable for
the effectiveness of the services they deliver’’ (Banks 2004,
p. 151). Moreover, given the critical observations of
authors writing on the sociology of professions that pro-
fession(al)s may ‘‘have an interest in keeping their work
opaque to outsiders in order to safeguard their freedom of
discretion’’ (as Levay and Waks 2009, p. 510, summarize),
some form of transparency seems to be needed. It should
somehow become clear to the public that profession(al)s
are delivering the services they are supposed to deliver.
Clark (2000) even states that it is a professional duty to
provide this clarity. As Roberts (2009) writes, some form
of transparency is needed ‘‘as an important check on local
collusion and as such as an essential source of confidence
for distant others’’ (p. 968). Most critics of professional
accountability do not deny this. However, they are critical
of the form this accountability has taken and of the extent
to which it has invaded professions.
So, as O’Neill puts it, one needs ‘‘less distorting forms
of accountability’’ (2002, p. 59) and as an alternative, some
authors suggest to use so-called ‘narrative’ forms of
accountability (O’Neill 2002; Etchells 2003; Kamuf 2007).
In such forms, an account is not given in terms of pre-fixed
categories (such as targets, norms, rules or protocols), but
in the form of explaining to and discussing with others
reasons for conduct in a way that allows for (commu-
nicative) freedom. It is, as Etchells (2003) puts it, an
account in the form of ‘‘a story rather than in figures’’ (p.
14). A typical example of this form of accountability is a
doctor who—without referring to binding rules or targets—
explains a diagnosis to a patient, discusses several alter-
native treatments, listens to possible objections, and arrives
at a professional preference (based on his/her knowledge,
experience, and vocation). Such narrative accounts, how-
ever, may not suffice in creating confidence to a wider
public (see also Roberts 2001). Additionally, given the
specific knowledge and experience of professionals (and
our lack of it), truly understanding the reasons for profes-
sional conduct remains problematic, except for other pro-
fessionals. Narrative accountability may therefore be an
insufficient form of public professional accountability.
One could say that we are faced with a dilemma of
professional accountability: On the one hand, we need
some form of public accountability to make sure that trust
in professionals is warranted. On the other hand, the cur-
rent forms of accountability1 may either harm professional
conduct and/or may not be able to provide the information
to satisfy a general public (e.g., Roberts 1991, 2009). To
deal with this dilemma, some authors propose what they
call ‘intelligent accountability’ (Roberts 2009; Sahlberg
2010; Ellison 2012; O’Neill 2002, 2013, 2014). O’Neill
(2014) writes that ‘‘an intelligent approach to account-
ability should support the intelligent placing—and refu-
sal—of trust’’ (p. 180). In the case of public professional
accountability, intelligent accountability systems should
support the public by providing it with evidence of pro-
fessional trustworthiness and in this way help to place (or
1 To be sure, many accountability systems are ‘hybrids,’ having
narrative and calculative aspects. Nevertheless, as the critics argue,
calculative accountability currently is the dominant form in such
hybrids.
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refuse to place) trust in professionals. However, Although
some authors provide some clues (e.g., Sahlberg 2010;
Hutchinson and Young 2011, and, in particular, O’Neill
2014 who formulates criteria for intelligent accountability)
it still remains unclear what intelligent accountability
systems should look like.
In our paper, we set out to describe an approach to
accountability which may fit intelligent accountability and
circumvent the dilemma of professional accountability.
While calculative and narrative accountability focus on
professional conduct and its results, we use notions from
the sociology of profession and organizational theory to
explore a form of accountability that focuses on the con-
ditions enabling professional conduct and its results. This
entails, for instance, showing that professionals have the
time, tools, regulatory potential, information, or incentives,
to actually and properly apply their specific knowledge and
experience and dedicate themselves to realizing some
societal value. In fact, as we will argue, accounting for
conditions for professional conduct fits, in our view,
O’Neill’s (2014) criteria for ‘intelligent accountability’ as
it provides relevant evidence (about enabling conditions)
that can help us to place (or refuse to place) trust in
professionals.
We organize this paper as follows. We first provide an
ideal-type description of professional conduct (‘‘Profes-
sional Conduct’’ section) and use that to explore the notion
of accounting for conditions for professional conduct. We
introduce this notion in ‘‘Accounting for Professional
Conduct: A Conditional Approach’’ section. Next, we
discuss conditions for professional conduct (‘‘Which
Conditions are Relevant for Ideal-Type Professional Con-
duct?’’ section), and explain what accounting for condi-
tions may look like (‘‘How to Account for Conditions
Enabling Professional Conduct’’ section). In ‘‘Is Account-
ing for Conditions a Form of Intelligent Accountability?’’
section, we argue that accounting for conditions can be
seen as a form of ‘intelligent accountability.’ In ‘‘The
Value of Accounting for Conditions’’ section, we discuss
the (added) value of accounting for conditions and reflect
on it. In ‘‘Summary and Conclusion’’ section, we conclude
and argue that accounting for conditions may be an anti-
dote to ‘managerialist’ accounting approaches.
Professional Conduct
Before we can discuss accounting for conditions for pro-
fessional conduct, it makes sense to first delineate profes-
sional conduct. This is, unfortunately, not an unproblematic
task given the many approaches to and accounts of pro-
fessions and professionalism (cf. Abbott 1988; Torstendahl
1990; Evetts 2003; or Muzio et al. 2013; for overviews).
For the purpose of this paper, we propose to follow the
approach of Freidson (2001) and give several ideal-type
characteristics of professional work. That is, in the spirit of
Weber’s ideal-type definitions of (cultural) phenomena
(Weber 1922), we define professional work from our per-
spective (i.e., understanding and formulating a suit-
able form of public professional accountability) as
consisting of several characteristics without the empirical
claim that all work that is called ‘professional work’
always realizes all characteristics to the same degree. Just
as Freidson (2001) gives an ideal-type definition of pro-
fessions, we give a related one of professional work. This
ideal-type refers to three characteristics: (1) the application
and development of specific knowledge and skills, (2)
‘intensive technology,’ and (3) the dedication to a partic-
ular societal value.
Freidson (2001) argues that professional work is ‘‘spe-
cialized work […] grounded in a body of theoretically
based, discretionary knowledge and skill’’ (p. 127). In our
view, this harbors two separate characteristics: first, pro-
fessional work can be said to need highly specific (tacit)
knowledge and skills, and second, it can be characterized
as ‘intensive technology’ (cf. Thompson 1967).
That professional work requires specific (esoteric/ab-
stract) knowledge and skills, acquired through an extensive
period of study and practice, is something that is common
to most definitions of professions. Implied is that this body
of knowledge is an accepted body of knowledge—thus for
instance ruling out (in some cultures at least) reading tea-
leaves as a profession. Characterizing professional work as
‘intensive technology’ (as Thompson 1967, describes it)
often remains implicit. Intensive technology refers to pro-
cesses in which ‘‘a variety of techniques is drawn upon in
order to achieve a change in some specific object; but the
selection, combination and application are determined by
feedback from the object itself’’ (Thompson 1967, p. 17).
In later work, intensive technology is also described under
the heading of ‘value shop’-work (e.g., Stabell and Fjeld-
stad 1998) or ‘solution-shop’ work (Christensen et al.
2010). All these notions highlight trial-and-error diagnosis
and treatment of unstructured problems. Based on context-
specific feedback from ‘objects’ (often: clients or patients)
professionals diagnose problems and needs, and propose
and adjust ‘treatments.’ Because professional work is
characterized as intensive technology, it can be said to
require the exercise of discretionary knowledge and skills,
which make professional work difficult if not impossible to
standardize or rationalize (Abbott 1988; Freidson 2001).
The third characteristic of our ideal-type is that profes-
sional work involves a dedication to a particular societal
value (e.g., health, justice, and security) for the sake of this
value, not because of economic gain or some other reason
(cf. Koehn 1994; Freidson 2001). Note that, this value is
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comparable with an ethical value; it is a value that ought to
be valued for its own sake—not just any value (cf. Koehn
1994, 1995, for an Aristotelian account of professional
values). Profession(al)s derive their societal legitimacy as
profession(al)s based on the dedication to this kind of
societal value. A dedication to such a value rules out, for
instance, a mere commitment to ‘what the client wants’ for
this may run counter to values that ought to be valued.
Indeed, this dedication is often seen as the moral duty of
professionals and professional behavior should be per-
formed so as to realize the societal value the profession
stands for, something which is often expressed in profes-
sional oaths or moral codes. This idea of moral duty or
dedication features in many descriptions of professionals
(e.g., Koehn 1994, 1995; Freidson 2001). Koehn
(1994, 1995) even holds that the professional pledge to
promote the relevant societal value is the most important
characteristic of professional work: it is the basis for the
trustworthiness of the profession and without it the other
characteristics remain meaningless.
Based on these characteristics, we ideal typically
describe professional conduct as conduct in which one
applies and further develops specific knowledge, skills, and
experience to make situation-sensitive judgments in the
context of intensive technology and as conduct that is
thoroughly based on a dedication to a particular societal
value.
Here, we would like to point out that by means of our
ideal-type approach to professional conduct we do not mean
to offer an ‘essentialist’ definition of professional conduct.
Instead, we use Weber’s (1922) approach and select an
ideal-type description of professional conduct to describe
conditions supporting it and, in the end, to formulate a form
of public professional accountability. Despite the fact that
professional conduct may be described in several ways, we
select this ideal-type description, because we assume that it
may help us to find a way out of the current ‘dilemma of
public professional accountability.’ We think that our
selection makes sense because, in the first place, other
authors also highlight similar characteristics when they talk
about professional conduct. Here, we can point at Freidson
(2001) who also employs an ideal-type approach to pro-
fessions with similar characteristics; or Koehn
(1994, 1995), Banks (2004), and others, who seem to offer
more essentialist descriptions (which include the charac-
teristics of our ideal-type). We can also point at authors who
describe ‘professional fields’ in terms of the different
institutional logics they harbor (e.g., Suddaby et al. 2009;
Carter and Spence 2014; Spence and Carter 2014). One of
these logics is what they call a ‘professional logic’ which
covers almost the same characteristics as our ideal-type.
A second reason for selecting these characteristics in our
ideal-type is that many of the problems of calculative
professional accountability (see introduction) refer to a
corruption of one or more of the three characteristics
chosen. A third reason will become apparent as our argu-
mentation unfolds: we set out to argue that based on this
ideal-type we may look for conditions supporting it. As it
will turn out, in discussing both enhancing and frustrating
conditions for professional conduct, commentators seem to
refer to characteristics included in our ideal-type. Fourth,
we argue that we can also apply our ideal-type prescrip-
tively and formulate conditions supporting professional
conduct according to the proposed ideal-type and thus
formulate a form of accountability that may suit profes-
sional conduct. Here, in fact, we follow other authors on
accountability (like O’Neill 2002, 2014; Roberts 2009) or
professionalism (e.g., Freidson 2001) who make prescrip-
tive suggestions. So, we employ the ideal-type both
descriptively and prescriptively in the hope of finding a
way out of the dilemma of accountability.
Accounting for Professional Conduct:
A Conditional Approach
The discussion about professional accountability in the
literature mainly focuses on accountability for professional
conduct itself. In a calculative account one is, for instance,
worried about whether professional work (i.e., its out-
comes) meets certain targets, or whether professional work
itself is carried out according to some set of rules or pro-
cedures. Narrative accountability allows for explaining and
discussing reasons for particular professional behavior as
the professional sees fit. Both forms focus on professional
conduct itself.
However, professional work is, of course, always carried
out in a particular social/organizational/societal context—
which conditions professional work. And, in our view, it
makes sense to incorporate these ‘contextual’ conditions in
professional accountability.
The context conditioning professional work has been
addressed in several ways. For instance, some authors point
at the fact that in the past professionals were mainly self-
employed, but nowadays many professionals work in
organizations (e.g., hospitals, or law firms, Suddaby et al.
2009; Evetts 2011; Muzio et al. 2013). As these authors
indicate, this organizational context clearly marks a dif-
ference in how professionals work and how their work is
controlled and regulated. Other authors point at the insti-
tutional context of professional work, which refers to the
‘‘regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements,
that […] provide stability and meaning to social life’’
(Scott 2008, p. 222). As Muzio et al. (2013, p. 700) remark,
professions have relations with ‘‘institutions such as mar-
kets, organizational forms, and business practices’’ and are
D. Vriens et al.
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‘‘targets of institutional change.’’ Clearly, to paraphrase
Scott (2008), changes in the relation between institutions
and professions also entail a change in the conditions
which ‘‘provide stability and meaning to professional life.’’
The context of professional work is also mentioned by
Freidson (2001, p. 216 ff.) when he discusses the difference
between what he calls ‘practice ethics’ and ‘institutional
ethics.’ Practice ethics relate to (dealing with) the ethical
issues that individual professionals encounter in their work,
while institutional ethics ‘‘deal with the economic, politi-
cal, social, and ideological circumstances which create
many of the moral problems of work’’ (p. 216, emphasis in
original). Freidson’s ‘institutional ethics’ thus concern
conditions under which professionals do their work and
encounter moral issues. Amongst these conditions, he
includes ‘‘the way [the professional] practice is financed,
administered, and controlled in the concrete places where
professionals work, and the social policies which establish
and enforce the broader legal and economic environment
within which practice takes place’’ (p. 216). In his dis-
cussion, Freidson argues that certain conditions should
themselves be declared unethical if they give rise to
morally problematic professional issues. Ethically prob-
lematic, for instance, is ‘‘providing working conditions that
prevent the performance of good [professional] work—
conditions such as over-heavy caseloads and inadequate
space, equipment, and support personnel’’ (p. 217).
In this paper, we take this Freidsonian notion of institu-
tional ethics (as the conditions for practice ethics) as a point
of departure for professional accountability and use it to
discuss what it means to account for the conditions for
professional work instead of accounting for professional
work itself. Put simply, accounting for the conditions for
professional work means showing that the conditions
enabling ideal-type professional conduct are realized. As
we will argue, this form of accountability can be regarded as
a form of ‘intelligent accountability,’ and may help to cir-
cumvent the ‘dilemma of professional accountability.’
Below, we will further elaborate the idea of accounting for
conditions by going into the following questions: (1) which
conditions are relevant for ideal-type professional conduct?
(2) how can these conditions be accounted for? and (3) how
does accounting for conditions fit intelligent accountability?
Which Conditions are Relevant for Ideal-Type
Professional Conduct?
Based on the discussions of conditions impinging on pro-
fessional work by authors on professionalism and profes-
sional behavior (cf., Larson 1977; Abbott 1988;
Thorstendahl 1990; Freidson 2001; Banks 2004; Lunt
2008; O’Neill 2002, 2013, 2014; Evetts 2011; or Muzio
et al. 2013) and based on authors from organizational
theory who describe conditions for transformation pro-
cesses in general (e.g., Galbraith 1977, 1995; Nadler and
Tushman 1997; Daft 2009; Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998), we
identify two general influencing conditions: goals and
infrastructural arrangements (see Fig. 1). Organization
theory authors sometimes refer to these two sets of con-
ditions as the ‘organizational architecture’ (cf. Nadler and
Tushman 1997). These conditions are, in turn, themselves
influenced by the profession(al association), the organiza-
tion they may work for, and the broader societal environ-
ment for which professionals ultimately realize a particular
value (see Fig. 1).
Goals Conditioning Professional Work
One conditioning factor refers to the goals set for profes-
sional conduct. Such goals define the effectiveness of
professional conduct. They determine what to pay attention
to while carrying out processes, and hence, they have an
influence on how the transformation processes are carried
out. This seems to be quite obvious, but for professionals
this simple logic has far-reaching consequences as goals
may enter the professional work-domain that may under-
mine its ideal-type characteristics. This is the main argu-
ment of Freidson (2001) who holds that goals related to the
market (profit maximization) and state/bureaucracy (max-
imizing the ‘‘predictability and reliability of […] services
and products,’’ p. 217) should not enter the realm of pro-
fessionalism. Market- and state-related goals are goals
from different ‘logics’ and do not fit the logic of profes-
sionalism. As he argues, a focus on predictability and
reliability of processes may come at the cost of profes-
sional context-specific discretion (pp. 217–218). Similarly,
a focus on profit maximization may lead to a decrease in
attention to quality, obligation and may even lead to an
impoverished state of professional knowledge as this
knowledge itself becomes an economic commodity (Frei-
dson 2001, pp. 218–219). As Freidson (2001) and Koehn
(1994) argue, the only ‘real’ professional goal is the real-
ization of the societal value the profession ought to realize.
While market or bureaucratic control goals are not prob-
lematic goals per se, they should not dominate the logic of
the profession. The more they enter the profession, the
more they lead to problems in pursuing professional goals.
As Freidson puts it, they come at the loss of the ‘‘soul of
professionalism’’ (2001, Chap. 9).
Similar lines of thought are also put forward by authors
who are informed by institutional theory. For instance,
Suddaby et al. (2009), Spence and Carter (2014), or Carter
and Spence (2014) argue that a dominant commercial logic
may come at the cost of what they call the (technical)
professional logic (which refers to calling, societal value,
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and specific technical expertise). Additionally, the prob-
lematic effects of ‘non-professional goals’ are also appar-
ent in the work of critics of calculative accountability. If
such goals are used to arrive at targets for individual pro-
fessional work, one may introduce incentives to behave in
an unprofessional way (cf. O’Neill 2002, 2014; Roberts
2009; or Schwartz 2011). Moreover, such individual per-
formance targets (e.g., short-term targets; efficiency tar-
gets; profit targets; or targets in terms of rule-following)
have been found to lie at the root of much instrumental or
even irresponsible behavior (e.g., Banks; 2004; Lunt 2008;
O’Neill 2002; Trevin˜o and Nelson 2007; Roberts 2009;
Schwartz and Sharpe 2010; Schwartz 2011).
In all, the type of goals governing professional work
affects that work. In terms of the characteristics of our
ideal-type description of professional work, we could, with
Freidson and others, argue that market and bureaucratic
goals may (1) hinder the application and further develop-
ment of specialized professional knowledge (e.g., because
a focus on profit may favor the application and develop-
ment of specific (i.e., profitable) knowledge), and (2) hin-
der professional work as intensive technology (e.g.,
because the focus on reliability, predictability, and cost-
reduction may come at the cost of discretion and the time
needed for dealing with clients; see Schwartz 2011). A
third problem (3) is that the more market and bureaucratic
goals govern professional work, the more difficult it
becomes to realize the profession’s dedication to its asso-
ciated societal value. So, the more market and bureaucratic
goals enter the profession, the less professional work is
conditioned as ideal-type professional work.
Infrastructural Arrangements Conditioning
Professional Work
The second set of conditioning factors are what we term the
‘infrastructural arrangements’ (cf. (Achterbergh and Vriens
2010; or Galbraith 1995 who uses the term ‘design’ to refer
these arrangements). These arrangements consist of three
aspects that directly influence the way professional work is
carried out: (1) the way work is structured, (2) the practices
and policies used to select, appraise, monitor, reward, and
develop (the performance of) professionals, and (3) the
technology professionals use to carry out their work (see
also Galbraith 1977, 1995; Nadler and Tushman 1997;
Robbins and Barnwell 2006; or Daft 2009). Although
Freidson’s (2001) idea of institutional ethics included such
infrastructural conditions, he did not explicitly elaborate
their nature. In this section, we use organization theory to
categorize these conditions and we briefly discuss them.
Structure
The first infrastructural aspect concerns the way in which
professional work is structured, i.e., how it is broken down
into sub-processes and how it is coordinated (cf. Mintzberg
1983). Traditionally, the structure of work can be charac-
terized by the degree of formalization/standardization (the
degree to which work is determined by rules and proce-
dures, cf. Donaldson 2001), specialization (the degree to
which work is broken down into sub-tasks, cf. Mintzberg
1983), and centralization (the degree to which decision
authority rests with only one or a few members of the
Professional conduct 
Infrastructural 
arrangement 
Goals 
organizaon profession 
Societal environment: 
- Market 
- State 
- General public 
Fig. 1 Professional conduct,
conditions, and ‘‘institutions’’
influencing these conditions
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organization, cf. Aiken and Hage 1971; Mintzberg 1983).
As many authors state, professional work as intensive
technology is enabled by organic structures rather than by
mechanistic structures (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1963;
Thompson 1967; Mintzberg 1983). Structures with tasks
covering the complete ‘job-to-be-done,’ with the decen-
tralized regulatory potential to deal with ‘cases’ and dis-
turbances as one sees fit, and with a low degree of
formalization, better fit ideal-type professional work. So,
the more one moves away from such structures, the less
professional work can be carried out as ideal-type profes-
sional work. As Freidson (2001) argues, bureaucracy,
which is typified by high levels of formalization, special-
ization, and centralization (cf. Donaldson 2001) ‘‘is natu-
rally at odds with professionalism (p. 217)’’ as it minimizes
discretion (similar claims were summarized by Wallace
1995).
It is possible to systematically discuss the influence of
both high and low degrees of formalization/standardiza-
tion, specialization, and centralization on the ideal-type
characteristics of professional work. However, that would
fall beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we merely want
to illustrate that structures may affect professional work
positively or negatively.
For instance, with respect to ‘‘professional work as
intensive technology—based on discretion and feedback,’’
discretion is frustrated by high degrees of formalization
and standardization. In fact, rules and procedures are meant
to curtail the discretion of professionals forcing them to
produce reliable and predictable behavior. However, they
cannot cover the complexities of professional conduct as
discussed above. Specialization into small tasks may also
hinder using feedback to adjust earlier professional deci-
sions and actions—which is often required in a professional
setting. For instance, if one assigns professional diagnosis
and professional treatment to different persons who even
work in different organizations (this threatens to be the
case in Dutch mental youth care) it becomes difficult to use
the problems encountered in a treatment to adjust the
diagnosis (which may also obstruct experiential learning
about particular diagnoses and treatments). Centralization
may also cause problems. For instance, doubts about the
progress of a treatment may cause a professional to run
additional tests and adjust the diagnosis or alter the treat-
ment. However, a high degree of centralization may
obstruct this as professionals may lack the decision
authority to decide that extra tests are to be carried out.
By contrast, low degrees of formalization, specializa-
tion, and centralization lead to structures in which profes-
sionals have the opportunity to exercise discretion (low
formalization) and use feedback related to all aspects of the
professional intervention to adjust their decisions and
actions (low specialization and centralization). Monsen and
de Blok (2013), for example, describe ‘Buurtzorg Neder-
land,’ a home-care organization in which professionals
work in teams performing all care duties for a number of
elderly people in a geographically restricted area. These
teams are self-sufficient, do their own planning, and have
decision authority to deal with disturbances. And, as it
turns out, this organization does not only enable profes-
sionals to do their work adequately (as judged by the
professionals working for it and by the patients treated), but
it also is the most cost-efficient home-care organization of
the Netherlands.
In all, if one characterizes professional work as intensive
technology it is, following Thompson (1967) a ‘structural
category mistake’ to organize it as long-linked technology
(as described by Thompson 1967).
Performance Measurement, Control, Reward, Motivation,
and Development of Practices and Policies
A second aspect of infrastructural arrangements influencing
professional conduct relates to practices and policies used
to select, assess, appraise, monitor, reward, sanction,
motivate, and develop professionals and their performance
(cf. Merchant and Otley 2007; Ferreira and Otley 2009).
Part of these policies and practices translate organizational
goals (as discussed earlier) into targets for individual work.
Another set of these practices is related to monitoring
whether professionals reach the goals set, to the overall
assessment of professional performance and to rewarding,
sanctioning, and motivating professionals—practices that
are closely related to accountability (cf. O’Neill 2014). In
this paper, we do not want to treat the influence of all these
practices on the three characteristics of professional work.
Instead, as we did with structural conditions, we want to
illustrate that such practices may condition professional
work positively or negatively. To do so, we will treat these
practices referring to three issues: (1) the degree to which
ideal-type professional goals enter these practices, (2) the
degree to which professionals themselves take part in these
practices, and (3) the form of these practices.
Practices like monitoring, appraising, and rewarding
professionals assume that performance targets are set for
individual professional performance. Whether these prac-
tices enable ideal-type professional work co-depends, in
our view, on the degree to which professional targets
govern individual professional performance. Put simply, if
professional performance is characterized by applying and
developing specialized knowledge, by intensive technology
(involving discretion and processing feedback) and by a
dedication to a societal good, then it follows that profes-
sional performance should be governed by targets reflect-
ing these three characteristics. In line with what we have
said in the section on ‘goals’ as conditions for professional
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work, then, we argue that monitoring, assessing, and
appraising professional behavior start with setting profes-
sionally relevant targets for individual professional per-
formance (cf. Hutchinson and Young 2011; O’Neill 2014),
i.e., targets related to Freidson’s (2001) professional logic.
Although it may seem easy to ward off non-professional
goals and targets, Anderson-Cough et al. (2000) show that
the incorporation of ‘non-ideal-type’ professional goals and
targets can be a subtle process of socialization. Their study
shows how a ‘client-is-king’ discourse may dominate the
life of accounting professionals and leads to the ‘‘inter-
nalization of demands and accountabilities within profes-
sional identity’’ (p. 1165); i.e., by means of socialization,
non-ideal-type professional demands are seen as ‘‘part of
being an accounting professional’’ (p. 1165).
The second distinction concerning performance control
and reward practices relates to the degree to which pro-
fessionals themselves take part in them (a point also made
by Levay and Waks 2009). Professionals know what their
work entails—better than non-professionals. Therefore, it
makes sense to include them in specifying targets for their
own work, in monitoring whether their performance is still
good, and in whether particular performance can be judged
as professional performance. In fact, including profes-
sionals in such practices was accepted in a time in which
professions were granted the autonomy to select and
monitor the behavior of their own members (cf. Freidson
2001; Banks 2004). However, with the increase of market,
organizational, and state control, this inclusion is waning
off. Nowadays, goals are often set by non-professionals,
representing non-professional institutions (e.g., Freidson
2001; O’Neill 2002; Lunt 2008; Schwartz 2011),
demanding metrics that are easy to obtain and understand
(O’Neill 2002).
The third dimension concerning performance measure-
ment and control practices has to do with the form they take.
The practices of setting individual targets, measuring whe-
ther these targets are met, and applying rewards or sanctions
are of course strongly related to the idea of accountability. In
fact, some authors even seem to equate (forms of) account-
ability to this particular set of practices. O’Neill (2014), for
instance, equates ‘‘managerial accountability’’ with the
sequence of ‘‘setting targets, measuring results, publicizing
these results, and sanction and reward’’ (p. 175). In the
introduction, we discussed two different forms of account-
ability: calculative accountability and narrative account-
ability. If applied to control of individual performance, we
can now appreciate these forms as particular ways of
instantiating a sequence of performance control practices
(setting targets, measuring success, publicizing, sanctioning,
and rewarding). Seen this way, we can state that the partic-
ular form an accountability-system takes (which may com-
prise more or less calculative/narrative components) to
govern professional conduct is itself a condition for profes-
sional conduct. Calculative accountability seems to demand
that professionals show to non-professionals that their
behavior is appropriate in a way these non-professionals
understand. Here monitoring and appraisal are cast in terms
of the calculative account and leave little room for expla-
nation and nuance beyond the account (cf. Messner 2009),
which,may not do justice to professional behavior. Narrative
accountability, in contrast, asks professionals to appreciate
their behavior in terms of the categories they themselves
would use and enables a discussion about their behavior. So,
narrative accountability would better fit practices of setting
targets, monitoring, and appraisal, doing more justice to
ideal-type professional work.
Technological Conditions for Professional Conduct
A third aspect of the infrastructural arrangement enabling
professional work relates to the ‘technological means,’
necessary for performing the work. This includes a rather
large set of means—including the equipment they use, the
physical lay-out of the space they work in, the ICT sup-
porting their work, etc. Although, perhaps, a conceptually
less challenging concept than structure and performance
measurement practices, it goes without saying that without
the proper equipment, ICT, etc., professionals will have a
hard time reaching their goals. In fact, as Freidson (2001)
remarks, providing ‘‘inadequate space [and] equipment
[…] should be declared unethical’’ (p. 217).
Organizations, Professional Associations,
and Society
As we discussed, professional conduct is conditioned by
goals set for it and the infrastructural arrangement profes-
sionals work in. These conditions, in turn, are dependent on
a broader conditional context: the organizations profes-
sionals work for, the associations they are member of and
the encompassing society.
That is, goals and infrastructural arrangements are pro-
vided by the organization a professional works in and the
professional body s/he is member of (see also Fig. 1). The
‘organization’ can refer to a private professional practice or
to a larger organization employing the professional (rang-
ing from small to large-scale national or even multinational
professional service firms; see Evetts 2011). In such
organizations, the degree to which professionals can set
their own goals and provide for their own infrastructure is
often much lower than in the self-employed situation.
Goals and infrastructural arrangements are also determined
by the professional associations. These associations may
set goals for professional conduct (e.g., they can specify the
nature and the quality of professional services; thus
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specifying what it means to realize the societal value the
profession is dedicated to). Goals for professional conduct
are also formulated in professional codes of conduct. Pro-
fessional associations can also influence the infrastructural
arrangements in which professionals do their work. For
instance, it may be that a professional association formu-
lates guidelines or procedures to deal with specific cases. In
the Netherlands, for instance, the veterinarian association
formulated rules with respect to prescribing antibiotics to
cattle preventively.
Moreover, the organizations and professional associa-
tions are, in turn, influenced by the larger societal context
they are part of (see also Fig. 1). For instance, insurance
companies, local, and national governmental institutions,
special interest groups, the general public, the media, the
industry providing equipment and medication for profes-
sional diagnosis and treatment all have an influence on the
goals and infrastructural arrangements conditioning pro-
fessional work. That this societal environment has an
influence, is of course nothing but a truism. Here, we want
to mention it because the influence of this larger environ-
ment often means that organizations and professional
bodies may not always be free in setting goals and devising
infrastructural arrangements.
How to Account for Conditions Enabling
Professional Conduct
After discussing the conditions for ideal-type professional
conduct, we now want to treat accounting for conditions for
professional conduct. In general, it takes the ideal-type
description of professional conduct as a prescriptive start-
ing point and seeks to show to outsiders that what is
required to perform it, is met. That is, based on what we
have discussed so far, accounting for conditions entails
showing the degree to which (1) goals set for professionals,
and (2) infrastructural arrangements in which they work
(a) enable the application and further development of
professional knowledge, skills, and experience, (b) secure
professional work as intensive technology, thus enabling
context-specific diagnosis and treatment based on discre-
tion and feedback, and (c) make sure that professionals
are/keep on being dedicated to the societal value the pro-
fession they belong to is supposed to realize.
Accounting for conditions, then, amounts to giving a
judgment about whether goals and infrastructural
arrangements enable/do not hinder professional work.
Concerning this judgment, at least two distinctions can be
made. First, it may be a simple or a complex judgment. A
simple judgment could be a general impression of whether
a professional in a specific context can do his or her job as
a professional (as in ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ or as in a score ranging
from 1 to 10). It can also be a complex, detailed judgment,
in which one addresses all cells of Table 1—which can be
done in a qualitative and/or quantitative way. In order to
arrive at such judgments one may devise instruments
(questionnaires, diagnostic tools, scales)—see example
below.
A second distinction refers to those giving the judgment.
A judgment may be given by professionals themselves
(e.g., directly, by means of questionnaires or having them
rating conditions, or indirectly, by means of some organi-
zational procedure for filing complaints about conditions).
These professional judgments may be aggregated into an
overall judgment about the state of conditions. Making
such information public, in turn, can be regarded as a form
of ‘conditional accountability,’ providing the public with
relevant information about conditions for professional
work.
Information about conditions could also be provided by
organizations employing professionals. In such a case, the
organization may present the aggregated judgments of
professionals themselves, and/or ask relevant independent
professionals to judge these conditions.
A judgment about conditions for professional conduct
can also be given by a professional association. In that case
the association judges, e.g., by means of an audit, visit, or
questionnaire, whether a particular group of professionals
can do their work as professionals given the particular
conditions they have to work in (e.g., judging the condi-
tions of professionals working in a particular organization,
or area where different conditions apply, e.g., state or
municipality). A professional association may also set up a
complaint procedure or a professional ombudsman where
professionals may voice criticism about conditions.
Besides professionals themselves, the organizations hous-
ing them, or professional associations, governmental bod-
ies (e.g., national health authorities in the case of health
professionals) may also employ professionals to arrive at a
judgment about conditions for professional work.
Given these distinctions (more can be given, but they
fall outside the scope of this paper), accounting for con-
ditions can take many forms, e.g., simple impressions or
more complex periodic reports by groups of professionals
themselves (e.g., belonging to one organization), profes-
sional associations or governmental bodies; see Table 2 for
an exemplary scheme.
Here we should note that, even though a judgment about
conditions may be arrived at by four parties, we think that
the most informed judgment about conditions is given by
the professionals who have to work in them (see also
below).
To give an example of what such judgments might look
like, we want to briefly discuss a procedure one of the
authors recently used to research the conditions influencing
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the work of Dutch youth mental health-care professionals
(in particular self-employed psychologists and psychia-
trists). In an interview, we first discussed what working as a
professional meant to them and what their work as pro-
fessionals entailed. Here, we wanted to make sure that their
descriptions fitted our ideal-type description. After
determining that it did, we then introduced our model
explaining how goals and infrastructures can influence
ideal-type professional work (both positively and nega-
tively) and asked for an overall score (between 1 and 10) as
an indication of whether the current conditions enabled
their work as professionals. Besides, we discussed each of
Table 1 Conditions for
ideal-type professional
conduct
Ideal-type professional conduct
Application
development 
specific knowledge, 
skills, experience
Secure intensive 
technology
Vocation/ 
dedication to 
societal value
C
on
di
tio
ns
G
oa
ls
Bureaucratic / state
- uniformity
- standardization
- efficiency/cost
Market
- focus on client
- focus on profit
- competition
erutcurtsarfnI
Structure
- specialization
- centralization
- formalization
Performance management
systems
- accountability
- development
- reward
- punishment
Technology
- ICT
- equipment
- housing
Table 2 Exemplary scheme of forms of accounting for conditions
Simple Complex
Professionals
themselves
Professional impressions/ratings with respect to overall
influence conditions on professional work
Reports stating professional judgments on all relations
between conditions/aspects of ideal typical work (see
Table 1)
Organizations
employing
professionals
Aggregated impressions/ratings of confidence in
conditions concerning the professionals working in the
organization
Reports stating professional judgments on all relations
between conditions/aspects of ideal typical work in the
organization
Professional
association
Overall impressions/periodic ratings of ‘confidence in
conditions’
Infrequent audit-reports concerning all relations between
conditions and professional work;
Reports by ombudsman related to professional association
Governmental
body
Overall impressions/periodic ratings of ‘confidence in
conditions’
Infrequent audit-reports concerning all relations between
conditions and professional work;
Reports by (governmental) ombudsman
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the cells of Table 1, asking for their opinion about whether
certain conditions were enabling or not. We also asked to
give a score for each row, indicating the overall supporting
effect of a condition. Based on this procedure, it was
possible to assemble and aggregate professionals’ own
impressions about the supporting state of the conditions—
both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Moreover,
based on this procedure it was also possible to pinpoint
distinctive (un)supportive conditions. This procedure may
yield a ‘conditional footprint’ for ideal–typical professional
work for a specific group of professionals. It should be
noted that this procedure is just an example and many
variations of arriving at such judgments may be devised.
At this point it is also worth noting that professional
associations and governmental bodies are already doing
research into and producing reports about conditions for
professional work. Looking at health-care, we can, for
instance, point at the American Nursing Association (ANA
2016) which reports about the working environment of
nurses (including conditions as culture, safety, and working
hours); the German ‘‘Marburger Bund’’ which reports on
conditions like working hours of and increased economic
pressure on physicians (IQME 2015), the Dutch VvAA
(representing several groups of health-care workers)
reporting on how increased bureaucracy affects profes-
sionals (VvAA 2016); Eurofound—an EU related agency
for ‘‘the improvement of living and working conditions’’
(Eurofound 2016)—which runs surveys about conditions
like ‘work organization.’ One of their reports discusses
how such conditions affect Austrian health-care profes-
sionals (Krenn 2010). We can also mention WHO (Eur-
ope), which has set up guidelines for investigating healthy
working conditions (Wiskow et al. 2010).
Is Accounting for Conditions a Form of Intelligent
Accountability?
To see whether judgments about conditions for profes-
sional conduct may be regarded as a sensible form of
public accountability, we want to use O’Neill’s (2014)
description of intelligent accountability. As we stated in
the introduction, intelligent accountability was introduced
as a form of accountability circumnavigating the pitfalls
of existing accountability systems. In O’Neill’s view,
intelligent accountability revolves around providing rea-
sonable evidence of trustworthiness (honesty, reliability,
and competence) of obligation bearers—in our case:
professionals. Intelligent accountability systems should
provide and communicate such evidence of trustworthi-
ness so that we can confidently place trust in profes-
sionals. In particular, intelligent accountability (1)
‘‘should begin from an account of what is required of
specific obligation bearers,’’ (2) should ‘‘provide evidence
of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness,’’ and (3) needs
informed, independent judgment and ‘‘would seek to
communicate this evidence […] so enabling the placing or
refusal of trust.’’ (O’Neill 2014, p.183f). In this section,
then, we refer to these three criteria to discuss (and refine)
accounting for conditions as a defendable (‘intelligent’)
form of public accountability.
Criterion 1: Intelligent Accountability Should Begin
from an Account of What is Required
As we see it, accounting for conditions is firmly rooted in
‘‘what is required from obligation bearers.’’ That is, we
propose to describe what is required as ideal-type profes-
sional conduct (consisting of the three characteristics), and
accounting for conditions seeks to show that the conditions
for this conduct are adequate. The main idea here is ‘If
society wants X from professionals, accounting for condi-
tions makes sure that conditions for realizing X are met.’
We propose to equate X with our ideal-type description of
professional conduct (see also ‘‘Professional Conduct’’
section).
In arriving at an account of what is expected from
professionals, one should make sure that this is a shared
account by the obligation bearers (professionals) and those
receiving the account. If, for instance, society expects
accounting professionals to be dedicated to competently
ensuring that (financial and other) information provided by
some party can be trusted—as relevant, complete, and true
(cf. ICAEW 2016), then accounting professionals them-
selves should also be dedicated to this value and not to
some other value, like, for instance ‘serving clients’ (cf.
Anderson-Cough et al. 2000). To align the expectations of
obligation bearers and those receiving the account one
could start with having professionals explicitly describe
their professional work (in terms of the ideal-type charac-
teristics). More complex instruments, like the questionnaire
developed by Suddaby et al. (2009), to find out to what
degree the professional logic is dominated by a commercial
logic, could also be used.
Criterion 2: Intelligent Accountability Should
Provide Evidence of (Un)trustworthiness
Accounting for conditions provides specific evidence that
can help to judge the (un)trustworthiness of professionals. In
our case, trustworthiness of professionals refers to whether
professionals can honestly, reliably, and competently show
ideal-type professional conduct. The evidence ‘accounting
for conditions’ provides, is in terms of a judgment about the
conditions required for this ideal-type professional conduct,
i.e., whether they aremet or not. Aswe described above, such
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evidence may consist in judgments by professionals them-
selves about whether conditions enable them to deliver
professional conduct. If, for instance, we are told that most
professionals in a certain hospital complain that its formal-
ized and centralized structure disables them to do their work
as professionals (or more general: if we know that profes-
sionals feel that they can’t do their work as professionals,
given the conditions they work in) this certainly provides us
with information that we can use to place or refuse trust. Note
that, in such a case we may not refuse to place trust in the
professionals themselves, but rather in professionals
exhibiting ideal-type professional conduct given the condi-
tions they need to work in.
On the other hand, suppose we learn that professionals
in another hospital state that they can do their work as
professionals. And if we ask some more, it turns out that
this means that in their opinion, the circumstances they do
their work in enable them to work in a professional way,
i.e., to dedicate themselves to the patient’s health, to apply
their specialized, tacit knowledge and develop it, to exer-
cise discretion and to make decisions doing justice to the
patient’s specific circumstances. Would such a statement
foster trust? Would it provide us with evidence about the
professionals’ trustworthiness? We’d say that it does (given
some provisions; see below). And based on this idea, we’d
say that accounting for the conditions for professional work
does make sense.
The case of the Dutch youth mental care referred to
earlier may also point at the relevance of conditional evi-
dence for placing (or refusing to place) trust. In this case
(see Vriesema 2016), it turned out that some child-psy-
chologists indicated that their work as professionals was
seriously threatened because of the way it had been
restructured and formalized. To decrease the number of
referrals to specialized (expensive) psychologists and
psychiatrists, the Dutch government had recently decided
to introduce a new system for referral and treatment (re-
lated to care paid for by insurance/government). So-called
‘easy cases’ should first be referred to a ‘social neighbor-
hood team’—a team of non-specialized care workers who
try to deal with these cases. Sometimes this works out if the
psychological problems are superficial (e.g., related to
‘standard’ behavioral problems). Difficult cases are refer-
red to specialized care. Moreover, general practitioners
(GP) who first see most children with psychological
problems decide if they are ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’ cases. And,
for the difficult cases, the GP decides the length of the
therapy (short, intermediate or long).
This new system entails a form of specialization in
which a task (the first diagnosis of psychological problems)
is no longer part of the job of specialists. Moreover, it also
means a decrease of decision authority regarding work, as
the GP—not the specialist—now decides on the length of
the therapy. This has led to severe problematic circum-
stances in which children were wrongly diagnosed as ‘easy
cases’ and received insufficient care. When this wrong
diagnosis was finally recognized, problems often had
already become worse (sometimes resulting in a loss of
faith in care), making it extra difficult to treat them. Other
problems emerged because GPs did not adequately deter-
mine the amount of sessions required. In such cases it
sometimes turned out to be impossible to treat a patient. An
additional reason for psychologists to complain about
conditions for their work related to an increase in formal-
ization. As budgets for mental health-care had been
decentralized to municipalities, every municipality had set
up its own system for screening and monitoring care-
workers, for granting budgets, for billing, etc. Having
patients from different municipalities, then, dramatically
increased workload.
Now, would this conditional evidence, provided that it is
reliable, help to place or refuse to place trust in profes-
sional conduct? We’d say that it does. Indeed, as the
described system change does not apply to privately paid
care, parents of children with psychological problems use
this evidence and are increasingly sending their children to
privately paid psychologists. Conditional information,
then, is already being used by society—although not in a
way that might improve care.
Criterion 3: Reliably Obtaining and Intelligibly
Communicating Evidence
The third criterion that can be derived from O’Neill’s
intelligent accountability is that evidence of (un)trust-
worthiness of professional conduct should be reliably
obtained, i.e., based on an informed (expert) and inde-
pendent judgment, and it should enable intelligible com-
munication to a wider public (O’Neill 2014,
pp. 184–185).
To start with the last issue, we think that information
about whether conditions enable professionals to do their
job as professionals can be conveyed quite easily to a
broader public. Simple judgments about the state of these
conditions (as described earlier) are easy to communicate.
In the end, there is one overall indicator: the degree to
which professionals themselves find that conditions are
enabling them to do their work as professionals. More
complex judgments (going into the relations between dif-
ferent conditions and aspects of professional work) may
require some more time to digest. In the end, however, they
also boil down to a judgment of professionals about which
conditions are or are not met, and which aspect(s) of pro-
fessional work is (are) in danger. We think that such
information can be intelligibly conveyed to a wider public
and provides evidence for placing or refusing to place trust.
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In fact, in the mental health-care example discussed above
even ‘complex information’ about the effect of structural
conditions was readily communicated to a general, non-
professional public, as shown by the coverage it received in
a national newspaper (Vriesema 2016).
The second issue is whether information about the
adequacy of conditions can be reliably obtained. This is the
case if such information is based on an informed (expert)
and on an independent judgment (O’Neill 2014,
pp. 184–185). A judgment by professionals about the
adequacy of conditions for professional work could hardly
be more informed. Who else would be in a better position
to judge the conditions for professional work than profes-
sionals performing that work in those conditions? So, the
lack of expertise is no reason for possibly unreliable
judgments. However, there may be other reasons why such
judgments may not be reliable. Such judgments may be
biased and can be tainted by opportunism or fear. Self-
employed professionals, for instance, may find it (com-
mercially) undesirable to tell the world that certain pres-
sures make that they cannot do their job properly.
Similarly, professionals employed in organizations may
(often rightly) fear that their judgments about the state of
the organizational conditions influencing their work may
have consequences for their own career. At the same time,
professionals may blame ‘poor conditions’ for professional
conduct to cover up their own culpable behavior and dodge
responsibility for it.
To counter such problems, safeguards should be built in.
For instance, by making sure that these judgments can be
done anonymously; or by employing independent profes-
sionals to gather diagnostic information about conditions
and to make it public on behalf of a group of professionals.
Such additional information may (dis)confirm statements
by professionals themselves. Independently collecting
information about conditions for professional conduct
might be regarded to be the responsibility of a professional
association. One could even think of governmental or
professional regulations prescribing the independent and
anonymous collection and dissemination of such ‘condi-
tional information’ (similar to the often required dissemi-
nation of information about indicators related to the
outcome of professional work). Moreover, reports or audits
of professional associations or governmental bodies con-
taining judgments about conditions are relevant as a form
of triangulation of judgments by professionals who are
working in the conditions themselves.
So, the question whether professional judgments about
the conditions for their work are reliable may depend on
the safeguards one builds into prevent opportunism, fear, or
downright fraud. In our view, these dangers are no reason
for refusing to rely on judgments by professionals them-
selves. Here, we follow O’Neill (2014) who argues that
‘‘[t]he dangers of corruption, producer capture, and pro-
fessional cosiness are real, but it is absurd to try to remedy
these by dispensing with informed judgement’’ (p. 185). In
all, we think that, if safeguards are built in, professional
judgments about the adequacy of conditions can provide
reliable evidence about the trustworthiness of their
conduct.
The Value of Accounting for Conditions
In this paper, we explore whether publicly accounting for
conditions enabling professional conduct could be regarded
as a relevant form of accountability—in addition to cal-
culative and/or narrative forms of accountability. By way
of a summary, we compare, in Table 3, the three ‘pure’
forms of accountability discussed in this paper (note,
however, that many systems of accountability are hybrids
of calculative and narrative accountability).
As we see it, conditional accountability might be
regarded as a form of accountability with its own merits.
However, before embracing this form as a relevant form of
accountability, we may first need to counter some objec-
tions to it.
Objection 1: Accounting for Conditions Does
not Show How Professionals Actually Perform
A first objection could be that if we only receive infor-
mation about conditions, we remain clueless about how
well a professional actually performs. This is true, to some
extent. Based on the provided information we may place or
refuse to place trust because we know whether a profes-
sional is enabled to do his/her work as a professional
honestly, reliably, and competently. We agree that this
information does not show that the overall result is ade-
quate, i.e., that professionals actually do their work hon-
estly, reliably, and competently. After all, there may still be
incompetent, sloppy or malevolent professionals perform-
ing poorly, showing opportunistic or downright criminal
behavior, even if conditions were met. Adequate conditions
increase the possibility of ideal-type professional conduct,
they do not guarantee it.
Here, we would argue that some form of monitoring and
controlling professional conduct itself is of course needed.
However, we would also argue that this may not neces-
sarily include (more) calculative accountability, and that it
may fall outside the realm of public professional account-
ability. Whether professional conduct itself is adequate can
best be judged by professionals and as O’Neill (2014) holds
we should expect professions and organizations housing
professions to have installed (1) proper systems of pro-
fessional peer-review and supervision, which may provide
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narrative systems of professional accountability, and (2)
proper complaint procedures and systems of inspection,
examination and punishment of professional misconduct.
These latter systems should be designed in such a way that
independent and expert judgments about professional
conduct are ensured (see also O’Neill 2014, p. 185).
Dealing with professional incompetence and malpractice is
necessary—but it does not mean that information about
indicators of the results of professional conduct should be
provided to a wider public. By contrast, what, in our view,
would help a wider public to place trust in professionals
might be information showing that the systems mentioned
above are installed and function properly, e.g., according to
independent expert professionals. Such information about
the proper functioning of these systems is, in fact, also
information about conditions for professional conduct as it
shows how a profession or organization housing profes-
sions seeks to secure adequate conduct by dealing with
professional misbehavior.
Objection 2: Good Calculative Indicators Make
Accounting for Conditions Redundant
A second objection might state that once one has good
calculative indicators, one does not need to be told that the
conditions are met. This may be so, but a major problem
with professional accountability is that such calculative
indicators are difficult to obtain. As we discussed, they
have the tendency to be unable to cover professional con-
duct; they are simplified abstractions, should be put into
context—which often requires professional knowledge—
and can be forged.
A related objection is that if calculative indicators are
met, we do not need to account for the conditions that led
up to these results. We would argue that if such indicators
were met, but the conditions for professional conduct were
not in place, one might have reasons to be suspicious about
these indicators and their values! This situation may point
at instrumental behavior, downright fraud, it may imply
that the indicators are poor indicators of professional
behavior, or it may mean that burnouts are about to be
expected, because professionals do a good job despite
disabling circumstances. Seen this way, if one chooses to
use output-indicators, information about conditions for
professional conduct can actually help to put the values of
these indicators in context.
Objection 3: Accounting for Conditions Denies
that Economic and Bureaucratic Control Goals are
Relevant for Professional Conduct
As we discussed above, accounting for conditions for ideal-
type professional conduct emphasizes Freidson’s profes-
sional logic. But, by doing so, it seems to downplay other
goals—notably economic and bureaucratic control goals
like efficiency, profitability, uniformity and equity—which
are also relevant for professional work. If one does not pay
attention to economic goals, professions may become too
expensive. Moreover, goals like uniformity or equity seek
to ensure that we can expect to be treated according to
Table 3 Comparing three forms of accountability
Calculative accountability Narrative accountability Conditional accountability
Description Account of professional
conduct in terms of fixed
categories;
No communicative freedom
Account of professional conduct in
accountor’s terms;
Allows for communicative
freedom
Account of conditions (goals/
infrastructural arrangements)
enabling/disabling professional
conduct
Object of the account Professional conduct and/or
results
Professional conduct and/or results Conditions for professional
conduct
Audience Often: distant others
(management; public)
Often: those in proximity (direct
clients; other professionals)
Possible for both distant others and
those in proximity
Merits Easy (public) access to some
aspects of professional work
Allows for including context and
professional discretionary
judgment
Easy (public) access to relevant
information about ensuring
conditions for professional
conduct without pitfalls of
calculative accountability;
Fits criteria of O’Neill’s Intelligent
Accountability
Problems Indicators may not do justice to
professional work;
May lead to instrumental
behavior; alienation, lack of
responsibility, public distrust
Difficult to convey information
about professional work to non-
professionals
Need for safeguards to make sure
that information is reliably
obtained and communicated
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accepted standards and are a safeguard against unequal
treatments and professional whim. A form of account-
ability which does not include such goals is suspect.
Instead, one should admit that there is an inherent tension
between economic and bureaucratic goals on the one hand
and professional goals on the other hand. So, one may
object, accounting for conditions (which emphasizes pro-
fessional goals) does not balance all relevant goals.
We do not deny that economic and bureaucratic goals
should enter professional work, and we also agree that one
should try to balance all relevant goals. In fact, we think
that accounting for conditions can actually support us in
finding this balance. In our reply to this objection, we
would like to stress that (1) focusing on professional goals
should be central if we want professions to realize the
societal values we want them to be dedicated to, (2) that
such a focus does not mean that other goals are unimpor-
tant, and (3) that empirical evidence shows that a focus on
conditions for professional work can actually be a starting
point for making it more ‘‘accessible and affordable’’ (cf.
Christensen et al. 2010).
We need to ask ourselves what it is we need professions
for. As put forward by authors on professionalism, society
depends on professions to deliver certain societal values
such as health, justice, or education (e.g., Larson 1977;
Abbott 1988; Freidson 2001; Koehn 1994). And, as Frei-
dson (2001) argues, if society appreciates this value as a
value a profession is supposed to deliver, it should not
emphasize an economic or bureaucratic perspective to
control professions. He argues that, if these perspectives
become dominant it comes at the cost of professional
conduct and hence at the values society wants these pro-
fessions to realize. Instead, society should allow for a
dominant ‘professional perspective,’ enabling professionals
to realize the societal values professions ought to be ded-
icated to.
But if a ‘professional perspective’ should be central—
would that mean that one needn’t pay attention to eco-
nomic and bureaucratic goals at all? No. In our view, it
means that there is a difference between realizing the
primary professional goal (conform the ideal-type) and
paying attention to cost and uniformity as secondary goals.
This entails, for instance, that a doctor should judge the
adequacy of several different treatments on professional
grounds. But if, based on these grounds, several equifinal
alternatives emerge, cost-criteria should be used to make a
decision. Similarly, as a general principle a doctor may be
guided by a particular protocol for treatment of some dis-
ease, but this doctor may decide to deviate from this pro-
tocol based on his/her discretionary professional judgment.
In both cases, the professional perspective is central but
economic and bureaucratic goals are not ruled out. Such
goals can enter professional decision making, but only as
secondary goals. If they become primary goals, they will
lead to the problems discussed earlier and function as a
disabling condition. So, making the professional perspec-
tive central does not mean that professionals do not have to
take into account economic and bureaucratic goals. It also
does not mean that professionals do not have to account for
their (non-)inclusion in their judgment. Although the main
logic should be the professional logic, the inclusion of such
secondary goals can act as a safeguard to ward off waste of
resources and inequity.
In addition, a focus on conditions for professional con-
duct (and hence on professional goals) is by no means at
odds with making professional conduct more ‘‘affordable
and accessible’’ (cf. Christensen et al. 2010; Monsen and
de Blok 2013). In line with notions from ‘organic organi-
zation theorists’ (e.g., Donaldson 2001) these authors
describe health- and home-care organizations which are
geared at optimizing the conditions for professional work.
Christensen et al. (2010) describe how they witness the
emergence of what they call ‘dedicated hospitals,’ and how
these are able to deliver better and cheaper professional
care. Similar organizations also emerge in home-care, for
instance Buurtzorg in the Netherlands (cf. Monsen and de
Blok 2013), showing that organizations structured around
professional work exist that deliver much better and far less
expensive care than traditional home-care organizations.
What is interesting about these health-care institutions is
that they lead to institutions which better condition pro-
fessional conduct and deliver affordable and accessible
professional services.
Objection 4: If Accounting for Conditions Means
that There is No Longer a Place for Calculative
and Narrative Professional Accountability, Then It
is No Good
Our suggestion to publicly account for conditions enabling
ideal-type professional conduct does not mean that forms
of narrative or calculative accountability are no longer
relevant. Narrative accountability is still required for
micro-accountability between professional and ‘client’
(e.g., explaining a patient why a certain treatment is pre-
ferred) or between professionals (e.g., in peer-consultation,
or professional inspection). The latter can be relevant for
securing the quality of professional work or for explaining
how primary and secondary goals were balanced. However,
as we discussed, narrative accountability may be prob-
lematic as a form of public accountability. Similarly, some
form of calculative accountability can still be relevant. But
here, we should be very careful. As a general remark, using
calculative indicators for the result of professional conduct
can only work if these indicators make sense in the context
of professional conduct. Although we do not rule out the
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existence of such indicators, many authors warn that such
indicators are difficult to obtain. Calculative indicators may
also be relevant for the secondary goals entering profes-
sional decision making (e.g., indicators taken from finan-
cial reporting). However, one should make sure that such
indicators have their proper place in professional
accountability (e.g., they may serve as input in professional
narrative accountability on how primary and secondary
goals were integrated). Moreover, they can be used as
signals indicating that conditions make professional work
(too) expensive and trigger a search for less costly condi-
tions (see discussion on previous objection). However, to
prevent a subordination of the professional logic, it seems
to be better to not use them for judging professional con-
duct itself. By contrast, indicators can be suitable for
conveying information about conditions of professional
conduct. As we discussed, the degree to which profes-
sionals believe that (their own) work as professional is
enabled could, for instance, be a relevant indicator.
An emphasis on accounting for conditions also does not
mean that following rules is no longer important (see
above). Rules, regulations, or protocols are still important
for professional work but only if they are accepted as
professionally useful and if, based on discretionary pro-
fessional judgment, deviations are possible.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we explored the possibility of ‘accounting for
conditions for professional conduct’ as a way of fostering
public trust in professionals. We argued that current forms
of accountability (notably calculative and narrative
accountability) may not be suitable as forms of public
professional accountability and that accounting for condi-
tions for professional conduct may be a valuable additional
form of accountability.
In order to do so, we started with an ideal-typical
description of professional conduct as conduct with three
characteristics: (1) it applies and further develops special-
ized knowledge, (2) it is intensive technology based on
discretion and feedback, and (3) it is devoted to a societal
value. We then explored the idea of accounting for the
conditions for professional conduct. To understand this
form of accountability, we first presented a model com-
prising the conditions for professional conduct and next,
we discussed how accounting for conditions could be
thought of and how it relates to the criteria set for intelli-
gent accountability, set by O’Neill (2014) and we reflected
on its (added) value.
We believe that accounting for conditions may have a
place in professional public accountability, alongside cal-
culative and narrative accountability, and that it may help
to foster public trust. In fact, we think that it can even act as
an instrument for the emancipation of profession(al)s. To
appreciate this statement, it is relevant to understand the
reasons why calculative accountability was introduced. As
Roberts (2009) or O’Neill (2002) note, we are often told
that such systems need to be introduced to create public
trust. But, as O’Neill (2002, p. 52) puts it, they are often
nothing more than instruments for controlling professionals
(a thought related to Freidson 2001) and need to be in the
form of numbers and rules because these are easy to
measure and understand (O’Neill 2002, p. 54). In this way,
professionals are controlled by the (governmental or
organizational) ‘paymasters’ managing them, i.e., by
‘managers’ securing other logics than a professional one.
However, this management itself is often not included in
these calculative figures. This seems to be strange because
management has a large responsibility for the conditions
enabling professional work. Accounting for conditions
does two things at once: it shows whether professionals are
enabled to do their work as professionals and it shows
whether management, i.e., those responsible for these
conditions, has created those conditions. In fact, as the
emphasis is on conditions, the attention of accountability
shifts from professionals to their management. It is there-
fore a professionally ‘liberating’ form of accountability,
away from a more managerialist approach (cf. Parker
2002).
Although this paper introduced and explored ‘condi-
tional accountability,’ some work is still needed to make it
into an operational form of accountability. In particular,
empirical work is needed to elaborate the set of conditions
and to make and validate manageable procedures for pro-
ducing an account of professional conditions (including
questionnaires and safeguards to make sure that reliable
accounts are given). Research is also needed to balance the
three forms of accountability into one appropriate system
for professional accountability—which may well be dif-
ferent for different professions. Although further research
is still needed, it is our belief that accounting for conditions
may well be a form of accountability that presents us with a
way out of the ‘dilemma of professional accountability.’
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